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We
take seriously all concerns about military low
flying. All complaints are looked at
individually and examined in detail,
commensurate with the amount of information
provided.
Complaints
are dealt with according to where the
complaint originates from.
RAF
Valley handles enquiries that are raised by
residents of Anglesey.
Other areas of Wales are investigated by the
Regional Community Relations Officer and his
staff who are based at Welshpool. Complaints
should be directed to - RAF Community
Relations Officer, Room 2/04, New Dolanog
House, Severn Road, Welshpool, Powys, SY21
7DA. Tel 01938 556363.
Anglesey
queries may be registered by telephone or in
writing to:
Station
Operations
Attn Flying Complaints
Royal Air Force
Valley
Holyhead
Anglesey
LL65 3NY
Telephone:
01407
762241 Ext 7869
If
you would prefer, you can contact the Ministry
of Defence dedicated, 24-hour telephone line
(020-7218 6020) at MOD Head Office which has
existed for many years to handle public
enquiries and concerns about military low
flying. You can also write or telephone any
local Royal Navy, Army Air Corps or RAF flying
station. Those living in Wales, southern
Scotland or Cumbria and Tynedale may direct
their concerns to the relevant Regional
Community Relations Officer.
Military
requirement for low flying (extract from MOD
site)
In
this section:
- The
need to low fly
- The
need to train to low fly
- The
UK Low Flying System
- Low
flying management
- Operational
low flying training
The
Defence Mission summarises the purpose of the
Armed Forces as being to defend the UK,
Overseas Territories, our people and
interests, and act as a force for good by
strengthening international peace and
security. To achieve this, we must generate
modern, battle-winning forces and other
defence capabilities to help: prevent
conflicts and build stability; resolve crises
and respond to emergencies; protect and
further UK interests; and meet our commitments
and responsibilities. In part, success depends
on our ability to recruit and retain the best
people for the job and train, motivate and
equip them properly.
The
Defence Mission statement flowed from the
results of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
which the Government initiated in May 1997 to
consider the pillars upon which the
fundamentals of future defence policy should
be based. The findings, published in July
1998, provided a blueprint for Modern Forces
for the Modern World; that blueprint is
summarised in the Defence Mission statement.
At the heart of SDR was the recognition that,
although the strategic threat posed by the
former-Warsaw Pact has disappeared, we are
increasingly likely to face new and often
unexpected operational challenges from other
quarters. Risks to international stability
come not only from traditional threats, like
the expansionist ideals of individual states
and ethnic and religious conflict, but also
from newer ones, like population and
environmental pressures, demand for scarce
resources, and drugs, terrorism and crime.
There
has been ample confirmation of the SDR's view
of the strategic environment in the time since
the policy framework was set up. Between May
1997 and the end of 1999, our Permanent Joint
Headquarters has planned and co-ordinated 38
operations across the world, some of which our
Armed Forces are still involved in. We
continue to monitor potential trouble spots
where tensions may boil over into fighting,
and where British military personnel may need
to intervene to protect our interests. One
thing is becoming increasingly clear:
situations can develop with little or no
warning. The ability of aircraft to deploy
quickly and conduct operations immediately
after arrival means that air power will,
inevitably, be at the forefront in most future
crises. However, responsiveness alone is not
enough; it must be backed up by a credible and
practised military capability and it is on
this foundation of military readiness that the
armed forces requirement to train regularly is
built.
None
of the recent operations in which British
forces have been involved provide any kind of
pattern for the way in which future conflicts
may be carried out. Our Armed Forces must be
ready to go anywhere, and do anything, at any
time. Their training must therefore include
the full range of capabilities in which they
may be involved, and must not be limited to
the theatre-specific scenarios of recent
conflicts. In short, we must train for the
future, not the past.
The
need to low fly
Combat
aircraft. The most effective defence
against any aggressor is to attack his
capability to make war. Combat aircraft
provide a substantial element of the firepower
necessary to deny an aggressor the sanctuary
of secure bases from which to plan and launch
attacks. To do so, they might have to evade
modern weapon systems developed specifically
to pose a serious threat to combat aircraft
and their crews. This can be in one of three
ways: flying at medium or high level with
support from specialist radar-jamming
aircraft; flying fast and low, using ground
contours to delay detection; or by a
combination of the two. The decision on
whether to operate at medium or low level
requires a complex balance of many factors.
The availability of specialist aircraft, for
example, cannot be guaranteed and when such
aircraft are not available, flying at medium
or high level makes our aircraft - and their
crews - more vulnerable to an enemy's defences.
It is on these occasions that it becomes
necessary to fly at low level, where the
ability to detect an aircraft is reduced
significantly.
Another
factor which drives the decision to operate at
high, medium or low level is the weather.
Although it might appear on television to be a
simple task to pick off a target using
precision laser-guided weapons, laser energy
has limitations, and cannot, for example,
penetrate cloud or a desert dust storm. As a
result, marking targets and delivering
precision weapons in less that perfect weather
may mean that an aircraft will have to fly at
low level to deliver its weapons successfully.
There may be many other occasions where
aircrew, if they are to execute their mission
and survive, may have to fly to their targets
beneath the coverage of enemy air defence
systems. Using terrain to evade the enemy,
aircrew can achieve the surprise that
contributes so much to the successful
completion of any military task.
Helicopters.
In combat, helicopters (like the RAF Puma,
above, during the 1991 Gulf Conflict) are
used for armed support of the Army on the
ground and for delivering and extracting
personnel and equipment from in and around
the battle area. They also carry out a wide
variety of role in support of ground forces
and at sea. However they are relatively slow
moving aircraft and therefore particularly
vulnerable to attack from the ground. By
flying at very low level and using ground
features to conceal their approach, aircrew
have a much greater chance of survival. At
these altitudes, the terrain can muffle the
sound of a helicopter, while the aircrew can
use every piece of available cover, allowing
them to approach and pass safely, undetected
and unobserved. During a conflict,
helicopters would almost never operate at
anything other than low level. However,
these techniques require regular and
realistic practice if they are to be
perfected, and for this reason helicopters
can be permitted to train as low as ground
level. Permission is sought from landowners
before landing on private property. In
peacetime, our Search and Rescue (SAR)
forces must be practised and capable of
flying at low level in the worst of weathers
to effect a rescue. Support helicopters have
also used the same skills to provide welcome
supplies to isolated populations and
livestock.
Transport
aircraft,
like the RAF�s Hercules, are used to drop
airborne troops and supplies from the air,
and to extract troops and equipment, when an
enemy force may oppose ground movements.
Although Hercules aircraft will never be as
agile or stealthy as others, approaches at
low level below enemy radar cover, using the
terrain to mask its presence, will greatly
increase survivability. In times of
international crisis, low flying skills will
also be used during humanitarian relief
operations to carry out air drops at remote
sites where it is not possible for aircraft
to land or take off.
The
need to train to low fly
Flying
an aircraft must be second nature to aircrew
so that they have the capacity to cope with
the psychological and physiological stresses
they would expect to confront during
operations. Low flying is a particularly
demanding skill which cannot be learned
quickly in an emergency. Only through
progressive training and continuous
demanding practice can aircrew acquire and
maintain the skills they need to cope with
the additional pressures of operational
flying.
Modern
equipment, such as forward looking infra-red
systems and night vision goggles, allows
Armed Forces to exploit periods of darkness
in ways that are often denied to their
adversaries, thereby reducing the threat
they pose. We are investing heavily in such
equipment and the new aircraft being
delivered to all three Services, including
C-130J Hercules, Apache and Merlin are all
fully night capable. Other aircraft, like
the Tornado, are being fitted with increased
night capability as part of major systems
upgrades and, as more of these aircraft come
on line, so our overall capability to carry
out more operational flying at night will be
increased. Realistic training at night is
therefore essential to ensure that our crews
are proficient in the skills required to
operate under cover of darkness, and in
order to exploit our technological
advantage. However, no more night flying is
carried out than is absolutely necessary.
RAF
fast-jet aircrew are taught the fundamentals
of low flying during their basic training,
on the Tucano (above). These skills are
developed during advanced training (carried
out on the Hawk) and at operational
conversion units. RAF multi-engine aircrew
carry out low level training on the
Jetstream. Helicopter pilots of all three
Services are taught low flying skills at the
Defence Helicopter Flying School, before
progressing to their own individual training
or operational conversion units. On joining
a front line squadron, aircrew are required
to practise low flying regularly in order to
make sure they remain ready to defend our
interests at all times.
The
UK Low Flying System (UKLFS)
The
UKLFS is designed to allow the efficient and
effective management of military low flying
while ensuring that the activity is spread
as widely as practicable. It covers the
whole of the open airspace of the UK and
surrounding oversea areas as far as the
boundary of the UK Flight Information
Region, from surface to 2,000 ft above
ground or sea level. Military fixed-wing
aircraft (except Bulldogs and Fireflies) are
defined as low flying when operating within
the UKLFS at less than 2,000 ft minimum
separation distance (msd). In the case of
helicopters, Bulldogs and Fireflies, they
are defined as low flying when operating at
less than 500 ft msd. 250 ft is the normal
lower limit for low flying by fixed-wing
aircraft, although a very small amount of
operational low flying training for fast jet
and Hercules transport aircraft is permitted
during the day at heights between 250 ft and
100 ft. Bulldog and Firefly aircraft may be
authorised to fly down to 50 ft msd while
helicopters can be permitted to fly as low
as ground level.
Low
flying in the UK used to be confined to a
network of separate areas linked by narrow
corridors; a map of this system can be
viewed by clicking here.
With the introduction into service of the
Tornado and improvements to the capabilities
of defensive radar and missile systems, a
more flexible system covering the entire
country was introduced in January 1979. The
main feature of this system is that, in
principle, the whole of the UK is open to
low flying. A number of areas are excluded
for safety reasons, including the airspace
surrounding airports, larger airfields and
certain industrial sites. We also avoid low
flying over the larger centres of population
and important conservation areas.
For
daytime operations, the UKLFS is now divided
into 18 Low Flying Areas. These include five
Dedicated User Areas, one of which is set
aside for use by HQ Northern Ireland and in
which most of the activity is of an
operational, rather than training, nature.
There are no set routes for low flying but
in some congested areas, �one way
systems� have been introduced to maximise
flight safety.
Map
of the day UK Low Flying System/Low flying
Areas
A
completely different system exists for low
flying at night, when the UK is divided into
two regions by a line drawn roughly from the
north of London to the Pembrokeshire coast.
The area south of the line is reserved for
helicopters while fixed-wing aircraft have
priority access in the area to the north.
The fixed-wing region is divided into a
number of night sectors and flight safety at
night is enhanced by restricting the number
of military aircraft permitted to operate
within each sector at any one time to one
aircraft or formation.
Minimum
separation distance is defined as the
distance which must be maintained between
any part of an aircraft in flight and the
ground, water or any object. It does not,
however, apply to separation between
aircraft of the same formation.
Low
flying management
The
policy for, and management of, the UKLFS is
determined by the Air Staff, based at MOD
Head Office. Day to day management of the
system is carried out by a central co-ordinating
cell at London Air Traffic Control Centre
(Military) (LATCC(Mil)) at West Drayton.
Aircrew must notify their intention to use
each Low Flying Area by giving their entry
and exit times to LATCC(Mil). As well as
recording the details of low flying
activity, LATCC(Mil) is the allocating
authority for each of the RAF�s Air
Weapons Ranges and is responsible for
issuing Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), and
advising aircrew of late warnings and other
information applicable to the UKLFS.
Although
the UKLFS allows military aircrew
flexibility for their flying training, there
is no free-for-all on low flying. Finding
the right balance between operational and
safety requirements and environmental
considerations is a matter of compromise and
stringent regulations are applied to the
planning and conduct of low flying. For
example, each low flying sortie must be
authorised in advance by an officer
qualified to do so. In addition, when
planning a training sortie, aircrew must
consider a routing which causes the minimum
disturbance to those on the ground.
Operational
low flying training
While
low flying by RAF fast jets and Hercules
transports is generally restricted to a
minimum separation distance of 250 ft, a
small amount of activity at operational
heights is permitted in three Tactical
Training Areas. These are located in some of
the most sparsely populated parts of the UK
� northern Scotland, the borders area of
southern Scotland and northern England, and
central Wales. Within them, RAF fast jets
and Hercules transports are permitted to
operate down to a minimum separation
distance of 100 ft and 150 ft respectively.
The Tactical Training Areas are only
activated at specific times each month, and
these can be consulted by clicking here.
When the Tactical Training Areas are being
used, routine low flying is restricted to a
minimum separation distance of 500 ft in
order to ensure it does not conflict with
operational low flying training. When the
Tactical Training Areas are not being used,
routine low flying is permitted down to the
heights described earlier in this section.
Operational
low flying training has long been a feature
of the UKLFS. It is necessary to prepare
aircrew for operational deployments and
exercises overseas. The amount carried out
is carefully controlled and monitored. We
make every effort to ensure activity is
spread equitably within the three Tactical
Training Areas, so that each one sees a
level of operational low flying training
proportionate to its size. Overall, the
volume of such training amounts to less than
1% of the total amount of low flying carried
out in the UK.
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